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RECENT CASES
IMPROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE ON MINOR HEIRS IN ADMINISTRATION SALE-

EFFECT ON VALIDITY OF SALE-NOTICE JURISDICTIONAL. Seal v. Banes, decided

by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma on May 15, 1934, and reported in 35
Pac. 2nd 704, is a case involving the sale of a deceased husband's realty
by his wife, the duly appointed administratrix, under the purported
authority of the county court of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The deceased's two
minor heirs, aged two and four, respectively resided with their mother,
the administratrix above, no guardian having yet been appointed for
them. At the time of the petition to sell the real estate to settle the
debts of the estate, an order was issued to the heirs to show cause why
the sale should not be made, and notice thereof was mailed to the heirs,
whereas an Oklahoma statute (0. St. 1931-Sec. 1278) specified that in
such cases notice should be personally served. The sale was made, and
the property passed in time to the present holders in due course, the
defendants ia the present action. The encumbrances on the realty had
been paid off during this period of time and the defendant's title had
been unquestioned for nine years. Oil was then discovered on -the land,
and now the plaintiff heirs, within the statutory period, and through
their guardian who was appointed some time after the probate sale, bring
ejectment against the defendants and seek cancellation of the sale made
by the administratrix as casting a cloud on their two-thirds share in
the real estate.
The Oklahoma Supreme court affirmed a decision for the minor heirs
in the lower court, holding that this was a proceeding in personam
against the heirs as adverse parties, and that notice was jurisdictional;
that without strict compliance with the statute, the county court had
no jurisdiction over the parties, and hence a sale under these conditions
would deprive the heirs of property without due process of law. In
holding that literal compliance with the statute must be had where the
court had limited jurisdiction, as they believed existed here, and that
failure to give proper notice was fatal to the validity of the sale, the
majority cited the following authority- Campbell et al v. Drass et al,
125 Cal. 253, 57 Pac. 994 (1899) Bloor et al v. Smith et al, 112 Wis. 340,
87 N. W 870 (1901) Lamont v. Vinger 61 Mont. 530, 202 Pac. 769 (1921)
Kline et al v. Shoup et a7, 38 Ida. 202, 226 Pac. 729 (1923).
A vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Busby concurred in by Mr. Justice
Bayless attacked the reasoning of the majority and asserted that the
decision was contrary to the established law in Oklahoma as stated
1)y GUmgnon's Lessee v. Astor 2 How. 319, 388, 11 L. Ed. 283 (1844), and
affirmed by Eaves v. Mullen, 25 Okl. 679, 107 Pac. 433 (1910), that it
would tend to overthrow the -titles of thousands of land owners who had
placed their faith in the validity of sales of real estate made in probate
proceedings, and consequently flood the courts with many cases attacking
these titles collaterally on the grounds of fatal defects in procedure
during the administration proceedings to sell. The dissent supported the
defendant's reliance upon the Michigan case of Grignon's Lessee v. Astor
supra, as decided by the United States Supreme Court almost a century
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before, cliaming this rule had been adopted by Oklahoma in Eaves v. Mu7Zen, supra, twenty-five years before. The Grignon case, supra, and the Mu7le case, supra, held that, in the former, (proceedings to sell -the realty of
an intestate) and in the latter, (proceedings to sell the realty of a guardian's ward), the court acquired general jurisdiction by statute at the time
the administration proceedings first began, and that all adverse parties
such as minor heirs were put on notice at that time; that the sales of the
property to pay the debts of the deceased and -the ward respectively,
dealing as they did with realty, were essentially proceedings in rem, and
that the statutory provision as to notice was merely directory not jurisdictional, and therefore not fatal to the validity of the sale.
The majority sidestepped the apparent rule of the Grgnon case, supra,
and the Mulen case, supra, by saying that in the former, jurisdiction was
obtained before the ultimate probate sale and that therefore the parties
were not adversary, the proceeding was n, rem, and the notice was
merely directory, and, in the latter case, there was a sale by a guardian
of a minor ward's property and therefore, the niinor was not an adverse
party, with the corresponding results noted just above. Moreover, said
the majority, in the case at bar, the admmistratrix was appointed without notice to -the heirs so that the argument that they had notice when
the proceedings first began (in order to sustain the defendant's claim
of general jurisdiction here) does not stand.
To this argument the minority countered saying that there was no
distinction between the Grgnon case, supra, and the Mullen case, supra,
since both were afmrnistration.cases involving the conveyance of realty
in probate proceedings; that most of the authority relied upon by the
defendants and rejected by the majority opinion as not applying (because
they did not involve probate sales wherein minor heirs were parties)
did in fact apply because as a class, they were admmnsstration sales, and
that as such, there was no distinction to be made; to make such a distinction now, the minority said, would be a dangerous innovation in Oklahoma law. These two contentions are essentially the point of interpretation upon which the court splits; the majority claiming that the
application of the statute must be strict and literal, to protect the vested
rights of the minor heirs and to guarantee them due process of law, as
in proceedings of this nature the court was a protector of minor heirs;
the dissent claiming -that it is more in accord with public policy to
protect the property rights of thousands of good-faith title holders who
have relied upon the validity of administration sales as being impregnable
against collateral attack based upon procedural error.
The dissent cited Washington authority as tending to uphold their
contention that such a proceeding is sn rem, and that failure to give
statutory notice is not fatal to the validity of the sale, Ryan v. Ferguson,
3 Wash. 356, 28 Pac. 910 (1891). Ryan v). Ferguson, supra, is the first
Washing-ton case on this point, holding that in a sale of community
property to pay community debts under administration proceedings, being
a proceeding n ren, personal notice was unnecessary unless requbred by
statute.
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It was followed by Ackerson v. Orchard, 7 Wash. 377, 34 Pac. 1106,
35 Pac. 505 (1893), which held that an administration proceeding was sn
rem, and to the contention of the appellants that the probate sale was
void for lack of notice to interested parties of the hearing of the petition
to sell the real estate, since the court did not have jurisdiction, the
court said that under sec. 144 of the 1881 code, Laws of Washington,
providing that an administrator could have immediate possession of the
estate of the deceased, -the probate court acquired jurisdiction of the
estate for the purposes of administration, and its action could not be
void for want of jurisdiction. The court having thus acquired jurisdiction, the estate could be administered and -the legislature had the power
to regulate such sale as it saw fit, even to allowing the sale without
petition or notice at all. The possible inference from this case that
-the Washington court would support the view held by dissenting Justice
Busby, that the jurisdiction having been acquired upon appointment of
the administrator, and the proceedings being in rem, the parties interested were put on notice at that time and that further statutory requirements as to notice would merely be directory, is overthrown, however,
for the court in this instance held that minor irregularities in the sale
would not disturb the -title of good faith purchasers at the probate sale
because the statutes had been substantially complied with.
The next decision of importance was Furth v. United States Mortgage
& Trust Co., 13 Wash. 73, 42 Pac. 523 (1895), to the effect -that since the
legislature can direct administration sales to be made without notice
if it desires, it of course can specify what kind of notice shall be given.
"According to the settled law of this state, under repeated holdings of
this court, upon the appointment of an administrator or administratrix,
respectively the court obtained jurisdiction over the real and personal
property of the deceased, and the administration of the estate zn rem.
Citing Ryan v. Ferguson, supra, Ackerson v. Orchard, 7 Wash. 377, 34
Pac. 1106, 35 Pac. 605 (1893) Hyde v. Heller 10 Wash. 586, 39 Pac. 249
(1895)
Dooly v. State, 10 Wash. 195, 38 Pac. 1000 (1894). Again note
that the court does not decide whether notice to interested parties such
as minor heirs is directory or jurisdictional; in other words, it is not
decided whether jurisdiction of the estate -ncludes jurisdiction over interested parties.
This point seems to be clearly raised and settled for the first time
in the case of Ball v. Clothser 84 Wash. 299, 75 Pac. 1099 (1904). There
the administrator of the estate had sold land at a probate sale without
there being a compliance with statutory requirements providing for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. for minor heirs and service of notice
upon them. The minor heirs upon becoming of age were allowed to
overthrow the title secured at the probate sale, such sale being declared
void, and to secure title in themselves, subject, however, to a lien in
favor of the good faith purchasers for the value of the purchase price
plus the legal rate of interest thereon, although no allowance was made
for money spent on improvements on -the land. (Here it is worthwhile
to note the equitable adjustment of the litigants' rights in this case and
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to compare them to the harsh and rather inequitable result reached
by the majority in the instant case.) The purchasers claimed, just
as did the appellants in the principal case under discussion, that since
the proceedings were in rem according to past Washington decisions,
that statutes relating to notice and method of sale were merely directory, and that non-compliance alone would not overthrow their title. The
Washington court said that even conceding that the administration proceedings were zi rem so as to give the court jurisdiction over the
estate, as stated in Ackerson. v. Orchard, supra, still, in order to get
2urmsdiction of the minor heirs and thus to assure them due process of
law, the statutory requirements as to notice must be followed, literally.
The court cited Bloom v. Burdick, 1 Hill (N.Y.) 130, 37 Am. Dec. 299
(1841) which case was definitely in accord with the majority opinion of
the principal case under discussion to the effect that although there was
jurisdiction of the court over the estate, yet jurisdiction over the persons
affected by the sale must be obtained by compliance with statutory requirements for notice. In this manner only, could the sale become valid.
Ba7l v. Clothter supra, concluded that the probate court had no jurisdiction to order a sale of the real estate because of the absence of notice
to the minor heirs and the failure to appoint the guardian ad litem for
them, and therefore, under the above authority, the minors were allowed
to avoid the sale.
Ball v. Clothzer, supra, seems to have been the last Washington case
raising the issue in question directly. From it and from the other cases
just cited, it clearly appears that in Washington, while the court has
jurisdiction over the estate upon the appointment of an administrator and
that in this respect the proceedings are in rem., yet the jurisdiction over
the interested parties such as minor heirs, which is essential to .the
validity of the probate sale, can be secured only after a strict compliance
with the statutory requirements of notice, if there be such a statute. It
is of importance to notice, at this point, that under the rule of this state,
an heir is vested with title to real property upon the deceased owner's
death, taking such title, of course, subject to the prevailing laws at that
date. Hence, in dealing with the question of fulfilling the statutory requirements as to notice, etc., in administration sales, it is to be kept
in mind that the minor heir has title in himself, which title is subject
to being divested to pay various administration costs and debts of the
estate, provided statutory provisions are followed- in the probate sale.
The most recent Washington decision on this question has in general
not changed the law in this respect in the least, State of Washington zn
re Laurtdseni et al v. Superior Court of King County, 79 Wash. Dec. 183
(1934).
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, it is now submitted that
Sec. 1494, Rem. -Rev. Stat., is the controlling law in Washington on
the question of jurisdiction of the parties by a court in ordering a
probate sale, except as such may be affected by the general rule in
this state that the statute in effect at the time of the death of the
deceased shall govern the probate sale of real property of the estate.
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The statute is quoted in part: "Whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that any portion or all of the real property should
be sold or mortgaged
the court may order the sale or mortgage of
such portion of the real property as appears to the court necessary for
the purpose aforesaid.
Unless the court shall by express order so
provide, no notice of the hearing of such petition for the sale or mortgage need be given, except as provided by sec. 1434, Rem. Rev. Stat.
hereof, (which merely requires the court to give notice of all important proceedings in a probate sale to those interested parties who
may request the same of the court in advance) if, however, the court
should order notice of such hearing, it shall determine upon the kind,
character, and time thereof
The absence of any allegation in the
petition shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction to order said sale
or mortgage and the court may if it see fit, order such sale or mortgage
or both without any petition having been previously presented." Clearly,
then, the rule in Washington today allows the court to order the probate
sale without providing for notice to minor heirs if it deems fit, and in
such case, the administration sale would be valid as against subsequent
claims made by the minor heirs and raising the objection of lack of
notice to them of the administration sale.
R. T. Y.

INHERITANcE TAx-APPLICABILrry OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION.

Deceased,

a resident of New Jersey left two parcels of land in Washington. The
land was subject to executory installment sale contracts. Held: the property was intangible personal property and not taxable in Washington,
In re Eilerinann's Estate, 79 Wash. Dec. 19, 35 Pac. (2d) 763 (1934).
The court thus again applies the doctrine of equitable conversion, and
deviates from the broad statement of As7ford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233
Pac. 29 (1925). The court relies upon In re Field's Estate, 141 Wash.
526, 291 Pac. 705 (1930)
2 WASH. LAw REV. 205, which held that while
no title passed under the executory contract, nevertheless, for the purpose of administration it should be treated as personal property- the
court in the instant case stating, "We cannot see any good reason for
holding that, for the purpose of administration of an estate, a vendor's
interest in such a contract should be treated as personalty but not so
treated when the question of inheritance taxation is involved. The two
situations are not distinguishable on principle." No mention is made in
the opinion or the briefs of counsel as to whether the contracts contained
a forfeiture clause, the court thus ignoring the forfeiture clause test,
3 WASH. LAW REV. 80, although in fact the contracts contained forfeiture
clauses.
The court relies upon two apparently contradictory statements from
Corpus Jurts. The first, that "under the principles laid down in later
U. S. Supreme' Court cases, -the doctrine of equitable conversion of realty
into personalty for the purposes of taxation is definitely overruled," 61
C. J. 1635. The second, that "the interest of a non-resident vendor in a
contract for the sale of land situated within the state is intangible
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personal property having its situs at the domicile of the vendor, and
it is not taxable in the state wherein the land lies," 61 C. J. 1636.
Upon examination of the authorities cited by Corpus Jurzs it is found
that the first statement is applicable where there was a direction in a
will to an executor or trustee to sell real estate and distribute the
proceeds. This may be termed equitable conversion by will. The second
statement is supported by cases where the owner of real estate had
entered into a contract of sale prior to this decease-the instant case.
It is submitted that there is a distinction between these situations. In
the case of equitable conversion by will, at the exact moment of death,
the testator died possessed of the full title, legal and equitable. On the
other hand where the contract has been entered into prior to death,
by the general doctrine of equitable conversion, the vendor dies holding
,the legal title in trust The tax should be levied upon the interest
possessed at the time of death. Therefore, while it is arguable whether
the doctrine of equitable conversion should apply in either case for the
purpose of taxation, a valid distinction may be drawn between the two
cases.
Undoubtedly, then, the Washington court relied upon the second
statement from Corpus Jums, and admits the distinction. The case of
In re Paul's Estate, 303 Pa 330, 154 At. 503 (1931), where the court of
the domicile refused to tax, is contra to the Washington holding in
denying the distinction, but not without a strong dissent.
A need for uniformity among the states in the application of the
doctrine of equitable conversion in such a case is found when the effect
of a variance is noted. In the instant case if after the Washington court
applied the doctrine, the New Jersey court applied it; or if neither court
applied it, then a uniform result would be reached. But if after the
Washington court applied it, the New Jersey court did not, then no
tax would be levied. On the other hand if the Washington court refused
to apply it and taxed it as real property in this state, and the New
Jersey court applied equitable conversion and taxed it as intangible
personal property, then both states would be taxing the same property.
No case has been found in New Jersey, but in the dissent to In re
Paul's Estate, supra, at p. 511 is found a statement from the Comptroller
of the treasury of New Jersey, stating in a letter dated December 24,
1930, that, "the rule of equitable conversion (as a general doctrine) is
well settled in New Jersey," and that applying that rule, "the state
of New Jersey would make no attempt to tax the transfer of resident
real property of a non resident decedent where such property was under
contract of sale entered into by said non resident prior ito his death."
Therefore, it would appear that in this case New Jersey would apply
the doctrine, tax as intangible personal property, and a uniform result
reached. However, if the decedent were a resident of Pennsylvania no
tax would be levied, the Washington court refusing to tax under the
doctrine of the instant case, and the Pennsylvania court under the doctrine of In re Paul's Estate, supra.
After having once determined that the property is intangible personal property, the court has both authority that it has its situs In the
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domicile of the owner, and only subject to inheritance tax by the state
of the owner's domicile, In re Lyon's Estate, 75 Wash. Dec. 98, 26 Pac.
(2d) 615 (1933) First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312,
76 L. Ed. 313 (1932) and, the reciprocity clause, Rem. Rev. Stat. 11203-1,
which provides that intangible personalty of residents of states not imposing an inheritance tax upon intangible personalty of residents of this
state shall be exempt from inheritance tax (it appearing such is the
law in New Jersey).
C. P Z.
MoRTGAGES-REFUSAL

OF CONFIRMATION-INADEQUACY

OF PRICE BID--

EFFECT OF FINANCIAL DEPRESSION. P is mortgagee under a real estate
mortgage in the amount of $1500, given by D, mortgagor, in 1926 covering
property owned by him in the city of Seattle. Default having occurred
after the sum of $300 had been paid on the principal, P instituted foreclosure proceedings and took a decree for $1563, plus attorney fees, costs,
and subsequent accruing interest. The usual provisions for sale by
the sheriff and for deficiency were embodied in the decree. The sale
was regularly held, and P the only bidder at the sale, bought the property for $950, leaving a deficiency of upwards of $613. Subsequent to
the mortgage sale, P filed the usual order of confirmation to which D
urged exceptions on the ground that the sale price was grossly inadequate
and insufficient. At the hearing which followed, both parties submitted
affidavits of experienced real estate men expressing their opinions as
to the present market value of the premises-those for D fixing an
average present valuation of $1766-those for P stating that the price
bid was not disproportionate -to the present value since the premises
were badly in need of repairs. The trial court refused to confirm the sale
to P on the ground that the price bid was "unfair, inequitable and grossly
inadequate" and ordered a resale for a price "not less than the amount
of the decree." Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to confirm the sale at the price bid, and
therefore reversed the judgment with directions to confirm the sheriff's
sale. Mellen v. Edwards et al., 79 Wash. Dec. 251 (Nov. 1934).
It is the general rule that in the absence of fraud and unfairness,
mere inadequacy of price will not invalidate a foreclosure sale, unless
the price is so grossly inadequate and unconsionable as to shock the
moral sense, or unless there be additional circumstances against its
fairness. However, if there be great inadequacy, slight circumstances
of unfairness in the conduct of the party benefited by the sale will
suffice to justify setting it aside. Johnson v. Johnson, 66 Wash. 113, 119
Pac. 22 1911). It is difficult to state a more definite rule than this, and
each case must stand upon its own peculiar facts. 19 R. C. L. 584. For
an elaborate discussion and collection of the cases bearing on the question as to the effect of inadequacy of price on a sale under a power in
a mortgage or trust deed, see annotation in 8 A. L. R. 1001.
In recent years, the general economic depression and its concommitant scarcity of money for ordinary transactions, have produced a
forced stagnation of the real estate market, with the result that foreclosure
sales are conspicuous for their lack of competitive bidders, the only per-
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sons present in nearly all such sales being the sheriff and the mortgagee.
The mortgagee in such a situation may bid in just what his fancy dictates, and if his bid is less than the foreclosure decree, he may saddle
the mortgagor with the difference in the form of a deficiency judgment.
Bearing -these facts in mind, courts of equity throughout the land have
treated the financial depression as an "additional circumstance" wich,
when coupled with inadequacy of price, will furnish sufficient grounds
for invalidating a foreclosure sale. The relief afforded to mortgage
debtors in such cases although essentially the same, varies in some particulars. Thus in Federal Title & Mortgage Guarantee Co. -v.Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 AsI. 538 (1933), where property valued at
$27,500 was bid in by the mortgagee for $100, the court agreed to confirm the sale only upon the condition that the mortgagee-purchaser
would credit the market value of the property to the decree. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Cody, 264 Mich. 258, 249 N. W 844 (1933), where the
present -market value of the property was $185,000 and the price bid
in by the mortgagee amounted to $86,000, the court refused to confirm
the sale and ordered a resale in the "hope" that a more favorable bid
would be received, or that a change in general conomic conditions would
result In a refinance of the loan. In Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Adam
Schumann Associates, 150 Misc. 221, 268 N. Y. S. 674 (1934), where the
value of the property was appraised at $17,000 and the mortgagee's bid
was $500, the court was unable to set aside the sale since the property
had been sold in the Interim to a bona fitle purchaser, but did refuse
to enforce the deficiency judgment against the mortgagor upon the basis
of the amount bid, and ordered a hearing to determine the true amount
if any of the deficiency. In Suring State Bank v. Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246
N. W 556, 85 A. L. A. 1477 (1933), where the property was valued at
$2,000 and the price bid in by the mortgagee was $600, the court valued
the property at an amount equal to the mortgage indebtedness, and
required that this valuation be credited against the debt as a condition
precedent to the confirmation of the sale; however the mortgagee was
given the option of accepting or rejecting the condition, and in the event
of his refusal to adopt, a resale of the property was directed. The court
In that case, in addition to the procedure adopted, pointed out two other
possible modes of procedure which might have been followed under the
circumstances: (1) It could have declined to confirm the sale and have
ordered a resale; or (2) it could have taken notice of the present emergency and after a proper hearing, fixed a minimum or upset price at
which ,the premises must be bid in if the sale was to be confirmed. However, as pointed out in 27 Illinois Law Review, at page 951, in commenting
on this case, it was said: "It is to be observed that no one of the above
alternatives is a conclusive check upon the possibility of the property
being sacrificed at too low a price. If the upset price in (2) above is
not bid at the sale, or if the procedure adopted in the case is rejected,
the case falls inevitably into alternative (1)-a resale must be had. Since
the complainant cannot be compelled to bid a higher price, and assuming there are no other bidders at the sale, the same difficulties would
be met that were encountered upon the first sale."
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The mere allegations, however, that the market is unpropitious for
the sale of the property due to a financial depression or unprecedented
scarcity of money, or forced stagnation of the real estate market will
not constitute such an equity sufficient to warrant a court in restraining
the sale. Bolick v. PrudentialIns Co., 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335, 82, A.
L. R. 974 (1932) Floore v. Morgan,--Tex.175 S. W 737 (1915) Caperton v. Landcralt, 3 W Va. 540 (1869) Muller v. Bayly, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 521
(1871)
Muller v. Stone, 84 Va. 834, 10 Am. St. Rep. 889, 6 S. E. 223
(1888).
Upon the question whether the court of equity in refusing to confirm
a foreclosure sale and ordering a resale, has the power to fix a minimum
or upset price at which the premises may be bid if the sale is to be confirmed, the cases present a split in views. Those acknowledging such a
power adopt the practice recognized in cases of foreclosure of corporate
property which is of such size and character as to preclude the establishment of a fair price by competitive or cash bidding. Sursng State Bank
v. Giese, suprai Those denying such a power exists, proceed on the theory
that such a limitation on the resale contravenes the statute giving the
mortgagee a right to a decree for the deficiency Mich-gan Trust Co. v.
Cody, supra. The Washington court in the instant case adopts this latter
view by way of dicta.
Somewhat analogous, and yet distinguishable from the establishment
of a minimum price on resale, is the practice under peculiar circumstances, of setting aside a foreclosure sale and ordering a resale, upon
the application of an interested party provided the latter offers to bid,
or produce a bona fide bid of another, in a sum in excess of the amount
bid at the original sale. John Paul Lumber Co. v. Neumeister 106 Wis.
243, 82 N. W 144 (1900) Dewey v. Kinscott, 20 Kan. 684 (1878) Wolfert
v. Milford Say. Bank, 5 Kan. App. 222, 47 Pac. 175 (1896)
Means v.
Rosevear 42 Kan. 377, 22 Pac. 319 (1889) Demaray v. Little, 19 Mich.
244 (1869)
Strong v. Smith, 68 N. J. Eq. 650, 58 Atl. 301 (affirmed in
68 N. J. Eq. 655) (1905) Rowan v. Congdon, 53 N. J. Eq. 385, 33 Atl. 404
(1895) New Jersey Nat. Bank v. Savemore Realty Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 478,
153 Atl. 480 (1931) Lents v. Craig, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 294, 13 How. Pr. 72
(1855)
Kirby v. Ramsey, 9 S. D. 197, 68 N. W 328 (1896)
Moeller v.
Miller 315 Ill. 454, 146 N. E. 449 (1925) Lefever v. Kline, 294 Pa. 22, 143
Atl. 488 (1928) Iron & Glass Dollar Say. Bank v. Wigman, 264 Pa. 146,
107 AtI. 661 (1919)
see annotation in 85 A. L. R. 1481.
The Washington court in the instant case, before deciding whether
or not the trial court had. abused its discretion in refusing to confirm the
sheriff's sale, first decided that although the jurisdiction of equity in
foreclosure proceedings may be purely statutory, and Section 591, Rem.
Rev. Stat. provides that the court shall refuse confirmation where there
are "substantial irregularities" in the proceedings, still this does not
deprive equity of its inherent power to refuse confirmation where it
appears that the price bid is so disproportionate to the true value of the
property that it is "shocking to the conscience" of the court. On the second
question whether or not the court has the power to refuse confirmation
of a sale, where -the price bid is inadequate due to lack of competitive
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bidding as a result of the financial depression, the decision points out
that such a power exists only where it appears that the mortgagee
is guilty of a "deliberate and wilful attempt to take advantage of the
general situation to further a selfish purpose and to enrich himself at
the expense of the mortgagor." The court, however, concluded that the
price bid by the mortgagee in the instant case was not so disproportionate to the present market value of the property, as to justify the
exercise of the extraordinary power of equity in refusing to confirm the
sheriff's sale.
To summarize the position which the Washington court has thus taken
In the situation where there is a failure to realize the full value of the
mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale due to the existence of a general economic depression, the following rules may be safely set forth as
follows: (1) Mere inadequacy of price unaccompanied by fraud or any
irrregularity in conducting the sale does not constitute a sufficient equity
to warrant a court in refusing to confirm the sale; (2) The court will
refuse confirmation, however, where there is present not only inadequacy
of price bid, but also a showing of deliberate and wilful attempt on the
part of the mortgagee-purchaser to profit from the situation at the expense
of the mortgagor- (3) The court will always refuse confirmation where
the pride bid is so low as to shock the moral sense.
J. J. L.
Naw TRTAL-ImPEAcHimENT OF VERDICT By AFFIDAVIT OF JuROn-ComVERDICT. The defendant appeals from a judgment of five thousand dollars ($5000) damages for the plaintiff in a tort action, one of
the grounds being the alleged misconduct of the jurors in resorting to
chance in the computation of the damages. One of the jurors was unable
to appear, and the parties agreed that nine of the eleven should bring in
the verdict. Affidavits were presented by -the jurors showing that several
sums were considered in the deliberations and that finally the jurors
agreed to be bound in advance by the vote of the majority upon two sums,
five thousand, dollars ($5000) and -two thousand dollars ($2000). Eight
jurors voted for the larger sum and three for the smaller. Upon motion
for a new trial there was a conflict in the testimony as to whether or
not the jury had assented to this sum subsequent to the vote, but the
court proceeds as though it had not. Held: That this was not a "chance"
verdict within the statute admitting juror's affidavits to show that the
verdict was reached by resorting to chance. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 657,
subd. 2). Mirabito v. San Francisco Dairy Go. et a., 35 Pac. (2d) 513
(Cal. 1934).
The impeachment of a verdict by affidavit of a juror showing misconduct is a procedure surrounded by many restrictions, though there has
been a tendency to relax such restrictions in some jurisdictions either
through statutes or decisions as is demonstrated by the statute applicable
in the Instant case and by a similar statute in this jurisdiction. (Rem.
Rev. Stat., sec. 399 (2.) That statute provides in part:
* * * wherever any one or more jurors shall have been induced
to assent to any general or special verdict, * * * other and different from his own conclusions, and arrived at by a resort to a
PROMIsE
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determination of chance or lot, such misconduct may be proved
by the affidavits of one or more of the jurors."
The rule against impeachment is founded upon the principle that'jury
deliberations are necessarily inviolate m order to effectuate the administration of justice, and the motives, mental operations, and sentimental
considerations of jurors have never been open to challenge. However,
certain types of jury verdicts have been held to be arrived at in such a
manner that the court will set them aside -through impeachment by
affidavit. The cases in which impeachment has been allowed have been
compiled as to our jurisdiction in a comment in 4 Wash. L. Rev. 78.
The "quotient verdict" is one type which has generally been held to
be impeachable. A quotient verdict is one in which an average of all
sums considered by the jurors is computed and determined as the true
measure of damages; no juror knows before the computation what the
exact amount will be. If the jurors agree in advance to be bound by
this sum and thereafter there is no further discussion, the verdict has
been held bad as a resort to chance and so impeachable through statutory authority or otherwise. The Washington court reached this conclusion in the early case of Goodman v. Cody, 1 Wash. Terr. 329, 34 Am.
Rep. 808 and note (1871). But a subsequent discussion of the amount and
its adoption does not render the verdict bad. Watson v. Reed, 15 Wash. 440,
Stanley v. Stanley, 32 Wash.
46 Pac. 647, 55 Am. St. Rep. 899 (1896)
489, 73 Pac. 596 (1903) Bell v. Butler, 34 Wash. 131, 75 Pac. 130 (1904)
Wiles v.
Conover v. Neher-Ross Co., 38 Wash. 172, 80 Pac. 281 (1905)
Oliver
Northern Paczfic Railway Co., 66 Wash. 337, 119 Pac. 810 (1911)
v. Taylor 119 Wash. 190, 205 Pac. 746 (1922) Other jurisdictions have
refused to allow impeachment of quotient verdicts. Shepherd v. InmanPoulsen Lumber Co., 86 Or. 652, 168 Pac. 601 (1917) Manhattan Oil Co.
v. Mosby, 72 F (2d) 840 (1934).
In the instant case there was an agreement in advance to be bound by
the decision of the majority, but the California court draws a distinction
between this case and that of the quotient verdict, citing DTxon v. Pluns,
98 Cal. 384, 33 Pac. 268, 20 L. R. A. 698, 35 Am. St. Rep. 180 (1893), a
case in which a quotient verdict was held to be a resort to chance. The
California court distinguishes the cases by pointing out that there exists
in the quotient verdict case an additional unknown element, since there
the jury did not know the figure upon which they were voting. Here the
jury accepted one of two definite figures as the measure of damages and
agreed to be bound in the alternative on the vote of the majority. The
court's interpretation of "chance" as an implication of the absence of
explainable or controllable causation necessarily distinguishes the instant
case from the quotient verdict situation and makes the agreement here
a compromise verdict, which verdicts have generally been held to be
unimpeachable. There has been some authority to the effect that dubious
methods of arriving at compromise verdicts should be treated by the
courts with disfavor. The Michigan court has said that it is the recognized duty of courts to set aside jury verdicts which are clearly compromise verdicts and which were reached by "splitting differences."
Buckner Loan Co. v. Bicher 221 Mich. 198, 190 N. W 670 (1922). The
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verdict here represented -the judgment of eight of the jurors and of
the other three because of the compromise arrangement which took the
form of an agreement to be bound by the vote of the majority. Such a
compromise verdict might well be set aside in a jurisdiction adhering to
the views expressed by the Michigan court. In the final analysis the
course of action to be taken in cases involving the setting aside of verdicts rests within the discretion of the courts. The exact problem presented by the instant case has never arisen in this jurisdiction.
J. G.
UsuRY-INTENT
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TO

MAKE

SALE
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CREDIT

UsuRIous.

A

applied to B for a loan of money. B declined, but in lieu thereof sold to
A upon credit certain corporate stock of the value of $12,500, for which
A gave B promissory notes totaling $17,506.25 at seven per cent interest.
In an action by A against B to recover damages for an usurious loan,
held this was a bona fide sale of the stock and not a loan of money,
although A had stated in writing at the time the notes were executed
that he was delivering the notes as evidence of an indebtedness for the
purchase price of the stock in order to circumvent the usury law. Rose v.
Wheeler 35 Pac. (2d) 220 (Cal. 1934).
Usury is the exacting, taking, or receiving of a greater rate than is
allowed by law for the use or loan of money. General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Weznrch, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S. W 425 (1924).
Instead of
making a loan in terms a seller may transfer something to a buyer that
is immediately and readily salable for cash, for which the buyer promises
to pay in the future a sum amounting to its present cash value plus an
amount greater than legal interest. Such a transaction intended by the
parties as a means of providing the buyer with money from the sale of
what is transferred is usurious. The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Contracts, -see. 529, comment d. Accord: Quackenbos
v. Sayre, 62 N. Y. 344 (1875).
This is not to say, of course, that simply because a buyer makes a bad
bargain in purchasing something on credit, the transaction becomes
usurious. A person may sell his credit, his responsibility, his goods or
his lands; and if he deals fairly, he may take as large a price for either as
he can get, and there can be no usury in the case. Tyler on Usury p. 92.
A sale of one's property for whatever price, no matter how unconscionable
it may be, does not in itself constitute usury. Blackmore Inv. Co. v.
Johnson, 32 F (2d) 433 (1929).
In the instant case the court held that -there must exist the corrupt
intent on one side to exact an illegal charge for the use of money lent
and on the other to borrow on usurious terms dictated by the lender,
elements which the court said were not present. So far as an intent to
borrow on usurious terms is concerned, the court overlooks the proposition that such an intent is immaterial so long as the purchaser does intend
to convert the thing received into money. The court relies entirely on the
fact that the borrower had expressly stated he was executing the notes
as payment of the purchase price for the stock. In respct to the former
requirement, that is, that the lender intend to make a usurious loan, it
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was held in Washington Fire Insurance Co. v. Maple Valley Lumber Co.,
77 Wash. 686, 138 Pac. 553 (1914), that one of the elements of usury is
an unlawful in-tent, that is, an intent to do those things forbidden by the
statute, but went on to say that it was not necessary that there be an
intent to violate the statute as such, -the law presuming the necessary
unlawful intent from the mere intentional doing of what is forbidden.
This decision is followed in a subsequent case in which the court presumed an unlawful intent from an agreement, fair on its face, between a
borrower and lender providing for performance by the lender of services
of questionable value. Robinson, Thseme & Morris v. Whittier et al., 112
Wash. 6, 191 Pac. 763 (1920).
0. J. J.

